中國肯定不是第一個試圖去托起一個正在下跌的市場的國家。美國、歐洲和日本的央行都在崩盤后買入股票并下調(diào)利率以提振傷痕累累的投資者方面顯露過身手。但是，具體的國情以及在過去10天中的介入方式使得中國成為這方面的一個外行，因而非常令人擔心。

A red flag
　　紅旗飄飄
　　CHINA is certainly not the first country to try to prop up a falling stockmarket. The central banks of America, Europe and Japan have all shown form in buying shares after crashes and cutting interest rates to cheer up bloodied investors. But the circumstances and the manner of China’s intervention of the past ten days make it an outlier, worryingly so.
　　中國肯定不是第一個試圖去托起一個正在下跌的市場的國家。美國、歐洲和日本的央行都在崩盤后買入股票并下調(diào)利率以提振傷痕累累的投資者方面顯露過身手。但是，具體的國情以及在過去10天中的介入方式使得中國成為這方面的一個外行，因而非常令人擔心。
　　The trigger in China’s case is perplexing. Yes, the stockmarket is down a third over the past month, but that has simply taken it back to March levels; it is still up 80% over the last year. Growth, though slowing, has stabilised recently. Other asset markets are performing well. Property, long in the doldrums, is turning up. Money-market rates are low and steady, suggesting calm in the banking sector. The anticipated correction of over-valued stocks hardly seems cause for much anguish.
　　在中國案例中，觸發(fā)點非常復(fù)雜。沒錯，股市的確在過去的一個月中下跌了三分之一，但是這僅僅是讓市場回到了今年三月份的水平；仍然比去年高出80％。增長，盡管正在放慢，但最近已經(jīng)企穩(wěn)。其他的資產(chǎn)市場表現(xiàn)良好。長時間低迷的房地產(chǎn)正在轉(zhuǎn)暖。貨幣市場利率處于低位且表現(xiàn)穩(wěn)定，表明銀行部門波瀾不驚。預(yù)期中的過高估值的股票的調(diào)整幾乎不能說是造成當前這種極端情況的原因。
　　Yet China’s intervention has screamed of panic. Had the central bank stopped at cutting interest rates—justifiable support for the economy when inflation is so low—that would have been reasonable. Instead, there has been a spectacle of ever-more drastic actions to save the market. Regulators capped short selling. Pension funds pledged to buy more stocks. The government suspended initial public offerings, limiting the supply of shares to drive up the prices of those already listed. Brokers created a fund to buy shares, backed by central-bank cash. All the while, state media played cheerleader. Far from saving the market from drowning, the succession of life buoys only pushed it further under water. The CSI 300, an index of China’s biggest-listed companies, fell almost 10% over seven trading days after the rate cut. ChiNext, an index of high-growth companies that is often described as China’s Nasdaq, fell by 25%.
　　然而，中國的介入?yún)s帶來了驚聲尖叫。倘若是央行停止降低利率——這在通脹處于低位時是對經(jīng)濟正確的支持方式——還情有可原。相反，人們看到的卻是一種更為激烈的救市景象。監(jiān)管者給賣空設(shè)定了上限；養(yǎng)老金基金做出了買入更多的股票的承諾；政府暫停了IPO，為了限制股票供應(yīng)以推升業(yè)已上市的股票的價格；多家券商組建了一只基金去購買股票，得到了央行的現(xiàn)金支持。與此同時，國家媒體充當起了拉拉隊的角色。但是，接二連三的救市措施不僅遠未將已經(jīng)溺水的市場拯救出來，反而是將其推入了更深的水中。在利率下調(diào)后的7個交易日中，中國大型上市公司指數(shù)——滬深300下跌了將近10％，常被稱為中國納斯達克的高增長企業(yè)指數(shù)——創(chuàng)業(yè)板下跌了25％。
　　Theories have flourished about why the government has waded in so heavily. The apparent desperation is, some believe, a sign that officials see a looming economic collapse, and are trying to staunch the wound before social upheaval ensues. That story is intriguing, but it is not the most likely.
　　各種有關(guān)政府為何要如此重手介入的理論大量地冒了出來。一種顯而易見的絕望是：有些人認為，這是政府看到了一場漸行漸進的經(jīng)濟崩潰，并試圖在隨之而來的社會動蕩之前治好傷口的一個信號。這種說法很有吸引力，但這是最不可能的。
　　Lost in all the drama about the stockmarket is that it still plays a surprisingly small role in China. The free-float value of Chinese markets—the amount available for trading—is just about a third of GDP, compared with more than 100% in developed economies. Less than 15% of household financial assets are invested in the stockmarket: which is why soaring shares did little to boost consumption and crashing prices will do little to hurt it. Many stocks were bought on debt, and the unwinding of these loans helps explain why the government has been unable to stop the rout. But this financing is not a systemic risk; it is just about 1.5% of total assets in the banking system.
　　被所有有關(guān)股市的故事所遺漏的一點是：股市，在中國，仍然令人吃驚地扮演著一個小角色。中國市場的自由流通市值，即可以交易的總市值，僅為GDP的三分之一。相比之下，發(fā)達經(jīng)濟體為100％以上。被投到股市中的錢不到家庭金融資產(chǎn)的15%：這正是為什么股票瘋漲對刺激消費貢獻很小，而股價暴跌幾乎不會傷及消費的原因。許多股票都是用借來的錢買的，而這些貸款的放松也有助于解釋為什么政府沒能讓潰敗停下來。但是，這種融資不是一種系統(tǒng)性的風險；它僅占銀行體系總資產(chǎn)的1.5%。
　　If economic stability is not in peril, why then the panic? The most compelling explanation is politics. The government has staked much credibility and prestige on the stockmarket. When the going was still good, the official press was chock-a-block with articles about how the rally reflected the economic reforms that Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, was set to push. Li Keqiang, the premier, said repeatedly that he wanted equity markets to provide a bigger share of corporate financing—comments, from punters’ perspective, not unlike waving a red cape in front of a bull. The sudden end to the rally is the first major dent in the public standing of the Xi-Li team. The botched attempts to stabilise the market only make them look weaker, giving succour to their critics.
　　如果經(jīng)濟穩(wěn)定不存在問題，那么，為什么會恐慌呢？最具說服力的解釋是政治。政府已經(jīng)在股市上押注了太多的信任和聲望。當一切尚好時，官方媒體上鋪天蓋地的都是上漲反應(yīng)了中國最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人習(xí)近平所推動的經(jīng)濟改革的文章?？偫砝羁藦娫磸?fù)表示，他希望證券市場能夠為企業(yè)提供更多的融資——從賭客的角度看，各種評論完全就是在一頭牛面前揮舞的那塊紅布。漲勢的嘎然而止是習(xí)李團隊在公眾面前的首個主要挫折。搞砸了的穩(wěn)定市場的嘗試只會讓他們看上去更加虛弱，給他們的批評者提供口實。
　　But the biggest concern about the panicked policy response is what it says about the government’s agenda. The economic hopes invested in Messrs Xi and Li stemmed from their pledge in late 2013 to let market forces play a “decisive role” in allocating resources. The actions of the past ten days have made abundantly clear that it is still the other way around: the Chinese government wants a decisive role in markets.
　　但是，有關(guān)驚慌失措的政策應(yīng)對的最大擔憂是在政府議程方面。投資在習(xí)李團隊身上的經(jīng)濟希望來源于他們在2013年做出的讓市場在分配資源方面扮演“決定性角色”的承諾。但是，過去10天的行動再明白不過地表明事實并非如此：中國政府想在市場中扮演一個決定性的角色。